The Impact of U.S. Export Control and Technology Transfer Regime on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Project'A UK Perspective by Moore, David et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2011-05-11
The Impact of U.S. Export Control and
Technology Transfer Regime on the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Project'A UK Perspective
David Moore
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/33614
Impact of U.S. Export Control and Technology 
Transfer Regime 
on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Project 
-- A UK Perspective






• U.S. requirements generated significant delay, increased costs, 
dampened initiative to increase capability, established critical restrictions 
on information sharing, and constructed barriers to effective supply 
chains.  
• The U.S. system is too complex and attempts to regulate all items.
• It was too early for UK participants to have solid views on the impact of 
U.S. requirements on JSF logistical support arrangements.  
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• There was growing support for UK firms to 
design ITAR-free items.
• The UK interviewees believed the U.S. 
needs a system which is predictable, 
transparent and focussed on sensitive 
technologies.  They were sceptical about 
the chances of successful reform.
Best Said By …
• "In all candour, I would encourage UK industry to design 
around the U.S. International Trafficking in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and produce ITAR-free items." -- Rt. 
Hon. James Arbuthnot, Chairman of the UK House of 
Commons Defence Committee
• "One of our suppliers had a fire at their facility.  We
determined that it was better to wait
for them to rebuild their facility than
try to get U.S. approval for an
alternate supplier." -- UK Industry
Representative
Costs - Delays and Suppliers
• There was UK acceptance of the need to have an 
export control regime to protect sensitive technology.
• But the U.S. system is not fit for that purpose.
• ITAR generated critical delays, generally 6-9 months.
• Delays generated a disincentive to look for better or 
cheaper suppliers.
• The focus was on “who is approved” rather than “who 
is the best supplier.” 
• Estimated increase of 30% of
JSF costs.
• ITAR delays generated problems
for work timelines.
Costs – Administration and Complexity
• ITAR generated substantial extra work, 
particularly additional administrative costs.
• One company had to train 600 people on 
ITAR details and establish a computer 
training program.
• There was excessive complexity and a 
lack of clarity.
• What is “access,” “disclosure,” or 
“technical data?”
Performance – People and Technology
• ITAR added an “additional bucket of sand” to working 
relationships.
• ITAR made it difficult to push the technological 
envelope.
• Affected the willingness of UK industry to pursue 
possible areas of technological development.
• The default position was play it safe.
• Using the traditional 80/20 split, ITAR 
hinders getting the remaining 20% of 
performance.
Performance - Information Sharing
• ITAR restricted exchange of data.
• Could not get the data to see if requirements 
should be challenged.
• Can not design a component in isolation.
• Could not always get details on modifications 
done in the U.S.
• Restrictions on nationals by ITAR generates 
practical and legal problems.
• One firm has 53 nationalities working for it.
• UK law bans asking about nationalities of
applicants for positions.
Intellectual Property Rights
• Perception that U.S. firms used ITAR to 
protect U.S. IPR.
• UK firms were concerned about impact of 
ITAR to restrict their ability to use UK IPR.
• If work is done in the U.S. on UK IPR, it would 
become covered by ITAR and  
“contaminated.”
ITAR Excesses
• ITAR is like “one drop of cyanide in a bucket of water.  
Once you’ve put the smallest drop in, everything 
becomes contaminated.”
• Concern that U.S. firms use ITAR as an excuse and 
a trade barrier to justify business decisions.
• The U.S. uses ITAR as an 
excuse for “sloppy work” –
Arbuthnot
• There were innumerable 
horror stories.
UK Access to Source Codes
• Remains a critical issue for the UK, so that 
it can have operational sovereignty.
• Source codes are key to integrating 
systems like Meteor on to the JSF.
• Views ranged from cautiously 
optimistic to very sceptical that 
UK will get all it needs on
source codes.
Need For Reform
• Saving grace: good working relationships.
• But growing support for UK firms to design ITAR-free.
• General UK view - the U.S. system is flawed.
• UK supports fundamental reform of the system.
• Higher walls around a smaller number of truly 
sensitive items.
• ITAR coverage now goes down to nuts 
and bolts.
• Even if substance of ITAR is 
unchanged, a better process would 
make a big difference.
• But scepticism about chances of 
successful reform.
Logistical Support and Cost of 
Doing Business
• Too early in the process for the UK representatives to have 
a clear view on the impact of U.S. regime on JSF logistical 
support.
• ITAR appeared to be too big a cost of doing business for 
small and medium-sized UK firms.
• Acceptable for large UK firms due to the amount
of money involved & the best technology.
- Estimates of $400 billion for JSF support work.
• Companies were not yet ready to say
“enough is enough.”
Conclusions
• Most of the UK commentary was quite negative and indicated a 
substantial amount of UK dissatisfaction, including growing support 
for producing ITAR-free items.
• If it is this bad in the UK, how bad must it be elsewhere?
• However, aggravation generated by the U.S. regime was still not 
great enough for the UK to walk away from major U.S. projects like 
the JSF.  
• But the attraction of participating in U.S. projects arises from the 
funding unavailable elsewhere and the opportunity to work on the 
best technology.
• This raises questions about UK support if U.S. defence budgets fall 
and the U.S. technological edge decreases. 
• From a UK perspective, the U.S. should
implement a system which is predictable,
simple, fair, transparent, and focused on
truly sensitive technology.
